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This paper develops a spatial perspective to examine the nature of China’s 
transnational influence, focusing on the implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
for international relations. Drawing upon political economy, regional studies and critical 
geopolitics, we argue that the most interesting puzzle concerning the BRI pertains to the 
ongoing reconfigurations of political space. Contemporary sociospatial reconfigurations as 
analyzed through a multidimensional framework offer key insights into the operations and 
the extent of China’s growing global power in general and with respect to the BRI in 
particular. We draw on a broad range of materials such as maps, Chinese academic and 
policy discourse as well as observations about corridor projects to theorize a) how the 
spatiality of global and regional connectivity is reconfigured through the process of 
China’s integration with the world; and b) how corridorization as a dominant physical and 
ideational process shapes Chinese investment projects and reconfigures state spatiality 
along the BRI. The results indicate that the main territorial pattern is not the nation or the 
region but the corridor. Furthermore, expansionist and unidirectional stories of China’s 
growing power overlook the local encounters and negotiations necessary for infrastructure 
projects to succeed. In addition, China’s economic statecraft is contextualized within the 
ongoing post-financial crisis political-economic restructuring of territories, places, and 
scales within the global capitalist system. 
 





















With over a $1 trillion US dollar in promised investment and large-scale construction 
projects, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has inspired a wealth of observations, research 
and disciplinary thinking about spatiality and space making (Jessop and Sum, 2018; Kuus, 
2019; Narins and Agnew, 2019).1 Various popular interpretations of the BRI suggest 
crucial spatial implications either on a continental, regional or local scale. Geocultural, 
geoeconomic and geopolitical approaches to the BRI highlight how various formations of 
space underpinning political order are undergoing reconstruction as China is intensifying 
its relations with the rest of the world (Agnew, 2012; Ferdinand, 2016; Flint and Zhu 
2019; Lin et al., 2019; Summers, 2016). Presumptions of larger-than-life investments 
clash with the realities of actual infrastructure projects, spurring heated debates about 
China’s hegemonic ambitions and its alleged neocolonial approach (Blanchard and Flint, 
2017; Nordin and Weissmann, 2018). Yet, a closer look at how Chinese infrastructure 
projects really affect the territorial configurations of states and economies on the ground 
leads to a more sober and nuanced understanding of the effects and limits of China’s 
influence.  
Exploring contemporary sociospatial reconfigurations offers key insights into the 
operations and extent of China’s growing global power in general and the BRI in 
particular. Domestically, the reform and opening policy of the Chinese government has 
                                                        
1 We wish to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editors of RIPE for their helpful comments. 
Previous versions of this paper have been presented at workshops at the University Nottingham 
Ningbo China and the National University of Singapore where we got invaluable feedback from 
participants. Thanks to Lewis Sanders for a helping hand with the language of this piece. 




used territorial rescaling and zoning techniques for decades, driving successful yet 
spatially uneven growth and development patterns. But, as much as the BRI’s emerging 
set of sociospatial strategies builds on earlier experiences, it also entails a departure from 
the spatial thinking of both imperial China and the reform-era period while at times 
resembling neoliberal practices of ‘state rescaling’ (Brenner et al., 2003, pp. 7-9; 
Schindler & Kanai, 2019). Taking a closer look at the recent explosion of novel 
representations of space within the Euro-Asian arena, we find that the Chinese state and 
investors respond to strong incentives to actively engage in a new ‘spatial fix’ both 
domestically and internationally. Such joint efforts aim at reconfiguring the geoeconomic 
vision driving Chinese capitalism in order to stimulate capital accumulation and expansion 
along a broader geographic scope ranging from the South China Sea to Europe and from 
East Africa to the Arctic. Importantly, the empirical reality of the BRI neither suggests 
that China is expanding its national territory as such; nor does it imply the redrawing of 
national borders of other countries. Instead, the role of space and scale for territorial 
organization, it seems, are newly imagined and reshaped in the context of the BRI across 
various regions.  
A detailed look at China’s economic statecraft generates critical insights into how 
China integrates with the rest of the world economically and politically and adds to the 
burgeoning scholarly interest in theorizing space making and forms of reterritorialization 
and rescaling across a variety of disciplinary fields.2 Our central research concern is to 
theorize, on the one hand, the ways in which BRI infrastructure projects influence the 
                                                        
2 See special issues in International Affairs on maritime zoning (International Affairs 2019, 
Volume 95, Issue 5), in Geopolitics on politics of border (Geopolitics 2019, Volume 24, Issue 2), 
in Territory, Politics, Governance on metropolitan scales (Territory, Politics Governance 2018, 
Volume 6, Issue 2). 




sociospatial formation of states and economies. On the other hand, we examine the 
question to which novel ideas of territory, scale, and place the BRI is giving rise to while 
shaping an extended transnational project of envisioning state-society-economy futures. 
We articulate these issues through two questions: First, how are practices and 
imaginations of spatiality of global and regional connectivity reconfigured through the 
process of China’s integration with the world? Second, how does the dominant physical 
and ideational spatial form of BRI investments – the corridors – reconfigure state 
spatiality along the BRI?  
However, a series of considerations for this  approach that must be considered 
beforehand. First, while the BRI is a state-driven project representative of a renewed 
emphasis on state-led investments and economic governance in China, it remains an open 
and evolving set of practices rather than a single grand strategy. Second, it needs to be 
stressed that the sociospatial restructuring within BRI countries and across regions is not 
simply imposed by Chinese agency. A key point here is that Chinese actors, while seeking 
their interests and contributing their development expertise and economic vision, 
inevitably have to tie into preexisting processes of spatial reconfiguration (cf. Easterling, 
2014; Ong, 2004; Swyngedouw, 1997). The spatial reconfigurations related to the BRI are 
part and parcel of a multi-directional and historically evolving phenomenon of uneven 
integration and fragmentation (see Barbalet 2014; Tooze 2018; Turner 2007). 
Unidirectional stories of China’s growing power, such as those told from a realist or 
geopolitical perspective, tend to gloss over the local encounters and negotiations necessary 
for Chinese infrastructure projects to succeed. In contradiction to the notion of ‘China’s 
rise’ that permeates much of the IR literature, a spatial perspective  advances the idea of 




China’s global integration as a process of mutual apprehension and co-construction, 
contributing to a more adequate and powerful conceptual wager (Klinger and Muldavin 
2019; Mayer 2018a). 
In the remaining sections, we scrutinize the implicit spatial assumptions of 
geopolitical and geoeconomic approaches to the BRI. We then develop a conceptual 
framework that draws on the multidisciplinary body of research in regional studies, 
development planning and critical geography, especially drawing on the ‘Territory-Place-
Scale-Network’ framework (Jessop et al., 2008). Empirically, our attempt  to theorize 
China’s effect on various dimensions of sociospatial restructuring is substantiated by a set 
of materials related to the BRI, including practices of knowledge production, map making, 
policy documents, academic discourse and ethnographic observations about effects of 
infrastructure projects—focused on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its 
similarities with other projects currently being developed under the umbrella of the BRI. 
The conclusion reconsiders China’s global integration in light of contemporary spatial 
reconfigurations to suggest theoretical orientations for further cross-disciplinary research.  
 
The BRI and global processes of restructuring space  
First proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, and sketched out in subsequent speeches 
and policy documents, the BRI’s two components – coined ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ 
and ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ – form an organic approach aimed at reaching 
greater infrastructural and economic integration along the routes which link East Asia with 
Western Europe (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). With an 
unusually grand scope and ambition, the Chinese government’s ultimate goal is to connect 




East Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Middle East and East Africa into a 
larger coordinated economic space. The BRI includes an array of new institutions such as 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund, which are meant 
to facilitate the financing of large-scale infrastructure projects (Mayer, 2018a). Up until 
the end of 2019, China has signed cooperation agreements with more than 60 national 
governments and international organizations and held two major Belt and Road Forums in 
Beijing in 2017 and 2019. A range of key infrastructural projects across the Euro-Asian 
continent are under construction while, according to various media reports, further 
investments amounting up to $8 trillion have been pledged (Hillan, 2018). When the 19th 
Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) enshrined the BRI into the CCP’s 
constitution in October 2017, it effectively became the umbrella for nearly all Chinese 
foreign policy. With the more recently proposed ‘Polar Silk Road’ and ‘Space Silk Road’, 
the Chinese government has extended the scope of the BRI even further (Huang, 2018; 
Sukhankin, 2018). 
However, conflicting perspectives of the BRI exist. On the one hand, popular 
accounts claim that an economically-successful China is in the midst of reinstalling a 
Sino-centric order across Asia that updates the traditional tributary system (see Callahan, 
2012; Howard, 2017). Such maneuvering could be viewed as the beginning of a new 
hegemonic cycle (Blanchard and Flint, 2017). On the other hand, scholars see the BRI’s 
ultimate aim in establishing a great power sphere of influence to exclude the U.S. from the 
Eurasian landmass in order to counterbalance the U.S. ‘pivot to Asia’ (Flynt and Wu, 2017; 
Haider, 2017). Both perspectives suggest that the BRI is the most vivid expression of 
Beijing’s challenge to the U.S.-led liberal world order. China, accordingly, is no longer 




viewed as a status quo power. Instead, it is seen as openly reshaping regional economic 
and political order in line with its own grand strategy (Tharoor, 2015, p. 2014) or—at the 
very least—establishing ‘parallel’ institutional arrangements that challenge existing 
international institutions (Heilmann et al., 2014; Nordin and Weissmann, 2018). These 
approaches— at times implicitly articulated – suggest a geopolitical reading of the BRI in 
that China’s new geographical outlook is crucial for understanding the changing world 
order (Kaplan, 2019). 
While such grandiose storylines are tempting, the real intricacies of the BRI suggest 
that power-based and overly state-centric narratives about China’s new foreign policy fail 
to capture the transformative character of the BRI, especially in terms of remaking space 
and scale. For instance, the claim that China wants to form a ‘neo-tributary’ system runs 
against the complex and fractured cultural, security and institutional settings of local and 
regional infrastructure politics (Ford, 2010; Pan and Lo, 2017). Similarly, even though the 
BRI is animated by Beijing’s push for a multipolar world order, its spatial dimensions 
cannot be reduced to a great chessboard where China counters the U.S. to break free from 
U.S.-led encirclement (Andornino, 2017; Overholt, 2015). Although the gigantic 
infrastructure investments of the BRI may boost China’s soft power (Singh, 2016), it 
needs to be seen as part of a broader ‘post-western’ search for collective identity within 
China and across neighboring countries that stirs conflicting territorial claims and spatial 
visions beyond the control of the Chinese leadership (Mayer and Balázs, 2018; Y. Wang, 
2016). Finally, the Chinese elites are relative newcomers to the ‘Eurasian moment’.3 They 
opted for an open-ended approach that responds to and tries to coopt conflicting 
geographical imaginaries and histories of connectedness among political and economic 
                                                        
3 For the concept of “Eurasian moment”, please see Bordachev (2015) and Yang (2014).  




elites across the Eurasian landmass (Kaczmarski, 2017; Mayer, 2018b). In short, 
conventional geopolitical frameworks either overemphasize the strategic agency of a 
‘homogenized’ China (Jones, 2019) or fall short of grasping the complex ways in which 
the BRI is embedded in multifaceted and multi-layered geopolitical processes. 
The geoeconomic literature, instead of reducing the BRI to a grand design for 
achieving mastery over Asia, situates the initiative in the context of economic 
globalization and China’s market integration (Breslin, 2013; Dent, 2016). From the 
vantage point of international political economy, the extensive scope of Chinese 
investments, political coordination efforts and developmental collaborations marks a new 
phase of economic statecraft which primarily springs from China’s shifting domestic 
economic imperatives. Starting from a semi-peripheral status at the onset of the reform 
period in the late 1970s, China managed to integrate into international production chains 
with a tacit acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the U.S.-led liberal world order. 
However, three decades of overly aggressive capital accumulation within China has led to 
serious economic and social problems, including rising labor costs, rampant financial 
bubbles, large-scale social dislocation of migrant workers, increasing regional income 
disparity, and severe environmental degradation. As a result, the Chinese economy, since 
the late 1990s, exhibited a decreasing return on capital investments alongside  increasing 
exposure to ‘capital glut’ and over-production (Arrighi, 2007; Hung, 2016). 
Overcapacities have occurred in the financial, real estate, steel, cement, and construction 
sector among others (Zhang, 2017). 
The signs of over-accumulation indicate a critical spatial juncture in Chinese 
capitalism: capital accumulation and expansion under the existing territorial limits of 




China’s domestic market are no longer sustainable. Under such circumstances, as Harvey 
meticulously records, capital engages in a ‘spatial fix’ to resolve or at least temporally 
defer its inner crisis tendencies by geographical/spatial reorganization (Harvey, 2001a). 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, there are intensified joint efforts between the 
Chinese state and different representatives of Chinese capital, even beyond major state 
firms, to further capital expansion overseas. For instance, the official ‘go-abroad’ policy 
announced in 1997 was the first major step taken by the Chinese state. The BRI is a much 
more comprehensive version of the go-abroad policy pursued against the background of 
growing economic imbalances, growing demand for resource and energy imports and 
difficulties to realize structural reforms domestically. Its mission to build hyper-
connectivity across the Euro-Asian space and its advocacy for improved trade and 
financial integration is meant to facilitate the continuation of profit maximization for both 
private and state-owned enterprises in China.  
The energetic and ambitious leadership of Chinese President Xi accelerated earlier 
political and financial tendencies. The year 2014 was a symbolic turning point, when 
China became a net capital exporting country. Between 2014 and 2018, Chinese 
companies invested more than $1 trillion in about 1,700 projects across 130 nations 
according to data from American Enterprise Institute (Clifton and Dai, 2019). As Chinese 
outbound investments grew rapidly, her trade and investment policies increased the 
regional gravity of China’s market economy (Yeh, 2016). The most visible parts of the 
BRI—the multiple layers of infrastructural constructions both over the land route and sea 
route along with other infrastructural facilities (such as dams, ports and special economic 
zones)—play a central role in providing specific spatial fixes at the regional level 




(Summers, 2016; Zhang, 2017). The official discourse puts emphasis on ‘connectivity’ 
and ‘linkages’ to such an extent that influential Chinese scholars interpret the initiative as 
an attempt to construct a China-led globalization in the form of ‘the-world-is-connected’ 
(Y. Wang, 2016), in contrast to the post-Cold War U.S.-led globalization in the form of 
‘the-world-is-flat’ (Friedman, 2005).  
The state-economy nexus at the core of the BRI’s vision of logistical networks is 
however nothing specific to China. It is in fact in line with the historically central role 
state agency played in capitalism. Large-scale investments in infrastructures involve 
extremely long turnover time relative to all other forms of capital (Harvey, 1982, pp. 398-
405). The state is particularly well equipped to channel financial flows on this spatio-
temporal scale for the planning and construction of “grand ensembles” of transport and 
urban infrastructures. Due to its capacity to allocate tax revenues and mobilize debt-
financed forms of investment as well as its regulatory control over the distinctive spatial 
configurations within which such investments are mobilized (Lefebvre, 1978, p. 238). 
While the state’s centralized territorial form, as its most important defining feature, 
provides unrivaled leverage over resources and social forces (including capital, land, and 
labor) in order to restructure socioeconomic relations (Mann, 1984; Brenner et al., 2008, 
p. 8), the administrative organization at subnational levels evolves in a complicated 
relationship with the shifting geographic features and historical periods of capitalism 
(Harvey, 2001a). For instance, Chinese investments abroad in mineral extraction, timber 
and other natural resources are subject to the rapidly changing conditions of local 
extraction, trading practices and production networks operating within the world economy 
(Mohan and Urban, 2019; Summers, 2016). At the same time, economic interests and 




structural changes at the provincial level are crucial factors shaping China’s external 
economic relations (Shahar and Lee, 2016; Summers, 2019; Xu, 2014).  
But the economic statecraft inherent to the BRI also exemplifies the limits of a one-
dimensional or over-determined reading of the ‘spatial fix’ (see Jessop, 2006). As massive 
transport networks become territorialized and geographically immobile, one has to take 
even more serious the Chinese state’s heterogeneous and shifting spatial strategies inside 
of global capitalism as a starting point to conceptually lodge the BRI within a historical 
process of changing domestic (and international) development strategies that apply 
varying models of territorial reconfiguration. As Schindler and Kanai (2019) argue, BRI 
investments are only one component of the ‘global growth coalition’ of banks, investors 
and international development organizations who are pushing for the construction of 
infrastructure and corridors—although China’s economic size and investment largess as 
well as its specific state-economy nexus arguably renders the country the most significant 
actor. In collectively seeking new spatial arrangements—that is, ‘getting the territory 
right’ in response to over-accumulation and global financial instability—Chinese investors 
are among those who usher in a new phase of capitalist reterritorialization (Jiang, 2017; 
Park, 2014; Schindler and Kanai, 2019; Zhang, 2017). In Africa alone, for instance, there 
are more than 30 large corridor projects in planning or under construction and Chinese 
experts and companies have become involved in the build up of dozens of special 
economic zones (Bachmann et al., 2018, Luo, 2016). Furthermore, the infrastructure 
design, planning and investment by Chinese companies, physically connecting China’s 
western provinces as well as metropolises with other regions and localities, remain 
conditioned by local and transnational processes that reshuffle the territorial and scalar 




constellations of economies, societies and administrations. As a result, Chinese 
infrastructure projects such as trans-Himalayan highways and energy grids depend on the 
support of instable local coalitions. The renegotiations of financial debts from 
infrastructure projects, meanwhile, reveal that China’s leverage even as a big donor is 
limited (Kratz et al., 2019; Murton and Lord, 2020). 
China’s economic statecraft needs to be analyzed, consequently, in the context of the 
ongoing post-financial crisis restructuring of political-economic organization of places and 
networks within the global capitalist system. This is possible by going beyond both 
assumptions of unidirectional power politics and mechanistic readings of ‘spatial fixes’. 
 
A framework of sociospatial reconfiguration  
To examine the ways in which BRI projects influence spatial configurations requires a 
fine-grained conceptual framework. Building on the insights from a growing body of 
literature that analyzes the strategies, politics and (re)productions of space and scale 
(Bachmann, 2016; Brenner and Elden, 2009; Bulkeley, 2005; Jessop et al., 2008), we 
follow the comprehensive heuristic suggested by Jessop et al. (2008). Their TPSN 
framework integrates and interrelates four spatial principles/fields including territory (T), 
place (P), scale (S) and network (N). Doing so enables ‘a genuinely polymorphic mode of 
sociospatial analysis’ (Jessop et al., 2008, p. 396) of the BRI and avoids a one-
dimensional analytical focus while offering three different yet interrelated conceptual 
lenses. 
Territorializing—refers to creating and maintaining boundaries and borders in 
geographic space. Research at the intersection of sociology, critical geography/geopolitics, 




urban design, and international relations theory challenges territoriality as a pre-given and 
unchanging feature of inter-state relations. It addresses the evolving scalar organization of 
political-economic life in which the link between state, territory, economy, and 
sovereignty are socially and politically reproduced and periodically reconfigured (Brenner 
et al., 2003; Elden, 2009; Steinberg, 2001; Strandsbjerg, 2010; Thrift, 1996). Hence, while 
territory is not a fixed container naturally identical with the borders of national 
jurisdictions, space is seen as ‘an outcome of territoriality, a human behavior or strategy’ 
(Elden, 2010, p.756). Within the politico-geographical system established by Westphalian 
practices of state territoriality – state space in the narrow sense – states have mobilized a 
variety strategies for parceling, regulating, monitoring, and representing temporal and 
spatial borders (Agnew, 2005; Brenner et al., 2003). Similarly, geographical imaginations 
of the world are constitutive of territorial practices and their contestation. Geographers 
emphasize that cartographic materials are generative elements in geopolitical processes 
that redefine the scope, the functions, and boundaries of global territorial space (Harvey, 
2001b; O Tuathail et al., 2006; Roberts, Secor, and Sparke, 2003). Maps are particularly 
relevant for the study of spatial imaginations because they are more than scientific 
representations of ‘reality’: they constitute a symbolic discourse that can mobilize dreams, 
aspirations, and worldviews (Agnew, 2003, p. 9; Callahan, 2009). Just as the territoriality 
of the modern state itself was a product of mapping and other scientific measuring 
practices to revise and reorganize space (Branch 2011; Crampton and Elden, 2006), we 
explore mappings and Chinese knowledge production about the BRI as relevant for the 
sociospatial reconfigurations implied by the BRI. 
(Re)scaling states—is about the politics of reshaping the nested and hierarchical 




organization of political and regulatory authority according to new spatial forms. In a 
Marxist perspective, advanced particularly by Lefebvre, Harvey, and Brenner, the scalar 
configuration of state-space is subject to constant change and contestation because of 
contradictions between the fixity and motion of capital (Brenner, 1998a). On the one hand, 
capital strives to ‘annihilate space through time’ in its insatiable drive to expand and 
accumulate surplus value (Marx, 1973, p. 539) through overcoming all geographical 
barriers to its circulation process. On the other hand, to pursue this continual dynamic of 
‘time-space compression’ (Harvey, 1989a), capital necessarily depends upon relatively 
fixed and immobile infrastructures. During the cyclic changes of the capitalist world 
system, the processes of ‘territorial rescaling’ are crucial elements of state responses to 
economic globalization (Brenner, 1998b). More broadly, such a perspective emphasizes 
how global capitalist dynamics involving companies and states reshape scalar structures of 
administrative organization and infrastructures (Harvey, 2001b; Swyngedouw, 2004). 
Accordingly, new sites of state regulatory activity, rescaled both at sub- and supra-state 
levels, are established under conditions of rapid geo-economic change (Brenner et al., 
2008; Sheppard and McMaster, 2004). For instance, to foster continuous growth, Chinese 
provincial and central governments combined scalar interventions and spatial planning to 
shape zoning strategies. Realizing a ‘rapid spatial development and reconfiguration of 
China’ (Lei and Shen, 2016), their goal was to effectively synchronize unevenly 
developed territories and places within national economies (local, urban and regional 
clusters) with transnational production chains and concentrated infrastructure-led capital 
accumulation (Fan, 1997; Lin, 2009; Mohan, 2013; Ong, 2004). In this vein, we examine 
the BRI as a process of (re)scaling of state space that can be observed unfolding on both 




supranational and subnational levels as it affects territory and places alike . 
Producing places—is about the production and linkage of concrete sites and places. 
Places do not only embody a ‘historical layering of crystallized social relations’ but are 
always ‘produced’ from nature through metabolic transformation (Swyngedouw, 2004, p. 
131). In the context of the BRI, the sociotechnical relations characterizing places are 
mainly reshaped through the planning and construction of corridors (Mayer, 2018b). In 
light of the discussion above (Brenner, 1998a; Harvey, 2001a), the BRI can be 
conceptualized as a transnational process of implementing the corridor as peculiar ‘scalar 
fix’. The concept of ‘corridorization’ grasps a flexible practice of territorial rescaling – not 
exclusively, yet especially in the context of Chinese foreign infrastructure investments. 
Hence, we explore the production of places as a consequence of rescaling territorial 
administrative practices and the reconfiguration—via infrastructure—of various places 
outside and inside of China into a network, in an attempt to create novel spatial 
relationships not only within the state unit but also across, between, and through territorial 
boundaries. 
Analytically, we employ three spatial prisms (T, S, P) in a two-step approach to 
examine the sociospatial reconfiguration contained in the BRI. The next section studies a) 
the converging representations of global/continental connectedness as it is reflected in 
visions, anticipations, and representations as well as the Chinese knowledge production 
serving such a reconfiguration and b) how the spatiality of statehood is coproduced 
through local and transnational negotiations and alignments by zooming into the on-the-
ground spatial organization, driven primarily by infrastructural projects of major economic 
corridors, in particular the  CPEC to illustrate meso-level sociospatial reconfiguration. 





Reconfiguring the spatial nature of China-World integration 
Scales of China-World relations 
The ever-expanding scale contained in the BRI suggests new ways in which China 
structures its self-position vis-à-vis the world and through which scalar configurations 
China relates to the world. At the macro-level, shifting geographical imaginaries and 
presentations of space are a crucial element to understand the reconstruction of space, as 
new ideas, visions, and plans that affect world politics represent and visualize  spatial 
configuration differently. Among the multiple spatial presentations of BRI, the most 
striking feature is the centrality of Eurasia, or more precisely, a Europe-Asia continent. 
The latter implies a spatial vision of China in the world in a manner very different from 
previous spatial visions held by either imperial China or early reform-period China.  
Like other pre-modern empires, in its transition from empire to nation-state, China 
experienced an uneasy shift from pre-modern unbounded understandings of space and 
territory to bounded understandings of space and territory in the early twentieth century 
(Callahan, 2009). One major type of pre-modern vision for China, characterized by 
Fairbank (1968) as ‘concentric circles of increasing barbarity’, portrays ancient Chinese 
capital as the core, the primary tributary states as the closer circles and the final circles as 
the unknown ‘Barbarian world’. Maps embodying such a vision do not represent a 
homogeneous space of equal sovereignty and legitimacy but rather a hierarchy of 
concentric circles with diminishing sovereignty from the imperial capital out to the 
periphery. As a result, ‘imperial maps of China’s domain are very detailed at the center 
but very vague at the margins, depicting an overall ambiguous and unbounded domain of 




empty or overlapping frontiers’ (Callahan, 2009, p.149). Such spatial visions also differ 
from the single line boundaries that tended to define the sovereign territories of the 
Westphalian international system.  
Recently, especially through the BRI, Chinese elites have come to perceive of 
‘Europe-Asia’ as a holistic economic and moral unit. As the country’s leadership has only 
focused on its immediate neighborhood for decades, China is a conceptual and intellectual 
latecomer when it comes to plans for the economic and infrastructural integration of 
greater Asia. For instance, up until the Hu Jintao era (2002-2012), the Chinese state’s 
overall foreign policy orientation only extended from the major powers (US, Soviet Union 
and post-Soviet Russia) to the immediate neighboring countries (Lanteigne, 2008: 
chapters 6-7). Chinese elites had not developed a strategic vision for the Indian Ocean, nor 
for the entire Europe-Asia continent, let alone the region beyond China’s immediate 
neighborhood.  
But this situation changed with the BRI. A leading Chinese scholar on the New Silk 
Road presents the BRI as a fresh approach that ‘signals China’s active involvement in 
building a new trend of globalization, rather than only looking for opportunities to seek 
profits from it. It is China that is now promoting the integration of Eurasia’ (Y. Wang, 
2015). While Chinese and foreign observers debate whether the BRI is a ‘Chinese 
Marshall Plan’ (Curran, 2016; Ling, 2015), the Chinese government has articulated a 
comprehensive vision often dubbed ‘China dream’, which links China with almost all 
countries in Eurasia.  
The process of geographic imagination still evolves and goes even continues to 
evolve, going beyond the Euro-Asian continent. Among Chinese academic and media 




circles, an un-official list of ‘65 countries along the Belt and Road’ (yidayilu yanxianguo) 
has started to circulate after the 2015 ‘Vision and Actions’ plan of BRI was released 
(Xinhua, 2017). These 65 countries on the list reflects what was stated in the  ‘Vision and 
Actions’ plan that ‘The Belt and Road Initiative aims to promote the connectivity of 
Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen 
partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road’ (National Development and 
Reform Commission, 2015). The list thus covers a continuous span of a large part of the 
whole Euro-Asian continent, plus Egypt.4 However, as more countries in Africa and Latin 
America, which are geographically non-contiguous with the Euro-Asian continent, signed 
official collaboration deals with China, the original unofficial 65-country list no longer 
made sense. Indeed, for its connotation of a finite number of countries ‘along’ a fixed ‘belt 
and road’, official sources never used this concept of 65-country. In official sources, Xi’s 
statement at the 2017 Belt and Road Forum in Beijing further emphasized that the 
BRI ‘focuses on the Asian, European and African continents, but is also open to all other 
countries. All countries from either Asia, Europe, Africa or the Americas, can be 
international cooperation partners of the Belt and Road Initiative’ (Xi, 2017). Such 
expanding scale of geographic coverage of the BRI further illustrates the open, flexible, 
but also vague nature of the spatial vision underlying the BRI, which may go even beyond 
the Euro-Asian continent.   
Mapping the BRI’s territory 
The maps that visualize the rhetoric of connectivity and connected dreams in BRI indicate 
a new spatial order. The repository of BRI maps we collected includes 39 maps prepared 
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by institutions and individuals based in mainland China and Hong Kong and 30 non-
Chinese renderings of the BRI, released between 2014 and 2018.5 Although produced by 
different agents and for different audiences, the majority of these maps share many 
common features. As one can see from one representative BRI map, the vast Euro-Asian 
continent with parts of North Africa is presented in these BRI maps as an open, coherent, 
and malleable space, where national political boundaries and natural landscapes are 
portrayed in a very deemphasized manner.6 What official BRI documents and maps stress 
is the corridor as central territorial formation. Six large corridors are especially 
emphasized: the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor; New Eurasian Land Bridge; 
China-Central and West Asia Economic Corridor; China-Indo-China Peninsula Economic 
Corridor; China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
Economic Corridor (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015).7 As a result, 
the Euro-Asian space is not only construed as such – as outlined in the section above – but 
also structured as a network of corridors that are supposed to facilitate ‘connectivity, 
unimpeded trade, financial integration’ (National Development and Reform Commission, 
2015). 
Flowing from the same logic, the locus of attention for the map-readers is instantly 
directed to the dots (manufacturing centers, transportation hubs, ports etc.), lines 
(transportation linkages) and stripes (corridors) in most of these BRI maps. As a result of 
blurry territorial or completely missing boundaries in these maps, statehood, sovereignty 
                                                        
5 All these maps are available from the authors upon request.  
6 One such representative BRI map is available at 
http://www.cssn.cn/jjx/jjx_gdxw/201502/t20150210_1512135.shtml?COLLCC=563023871&. 
7 One BRI map illustrating these 6 corridors is available at http://china-trade-
research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-
Initiative/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36B7.htm. 




and fixed boundaries as the key defining features of the interstate system are downplayed  
(Narins and Agnew, 2019). Most BRI maps, whether produced by Chinese agencies or 
non-Chinese agencies, instead highlight linkages between hubs and cities. Many of them 
illustrate or highlight the networks and how space, not defined by traditional state 
boundaries, is structured through transnational corridors.  
The territoriality suggested by BRI maps is strikingly different from historical 
Chinese maps. If in the early 20th century one witnessed a transition from ‘imperial 
domain’s hierarchical unbounded space’ to ‘sovereign territory’s homogeneous bounded 
space’ in the spatial vision of the Chinese elites (Callahan, 2009: 159), what has emerged 
with the BRI-related spatial representation can be called a ‘homogenous unbounded space’ 
across the Euro-Asian continent. As a result, the overlapping and multiple spaces reflected 
through BRI maps undermine the hegemonic understanding of modernist territorial 
sovereignty (see Agnew, 2010).  
Finally, as a consequence of decentering old Europe and eclipsing the Americas, 
either Central Asia or the Indian Ocean move to the center stage in most of these BRI 
maps. Thus, the BRI territorial vision and spatial representation of the world challenges 
the long-held view about ancient Chinese self-understanding of their place in the world: 
China is not presented in these maps as the center of the world. At the same time, the 
boundaries and edges of these maps invoke—explicitly and implicitly—a Euro-Asia that 
is independent or cut off from its transatlantic and transpacific relations.    
Coproducing BRI places  
As projects such as ports, dams, roads, railways and industrial zones materialize, many 
places will be inevitably transformed. The (imaginary) sites to emerge from the BRI are 




no longer expected to have a peripheral economic nature. Official narratives downplay the 
traditional center-periphery dichotomy of the global economy. As such, the center of BRI 
is not necessarily limited to China and Europe. Through ‘coordination’ or ‘docking’ 
(duijie in Chinese) and the expansion of regions covered by the BRI, the alleged 
‘peripheral’ regions and countries can all become regional centers in their own way (Zeng, 
2015; H. Wang, 2016). In this sense, Chinese whitepapers, policy documents, and official 
speeches highlight the open and non-exclusive nature of the BRI, encouraging all 
countries along the BRI to develop their own ‘Silk Road’ plans. Through further 
integration of all these local ‘Silk Road’ plans, China and all connected countries are 
supposed to ultimately benefit from coordination and collaboration between these 
different plans (Xi, 2016). The Chinese state has openly declared plans to integrate similar 
regional economic integration plans proposed by, for instance, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Mongolia, South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia, etc. with the BRI (Xia, 2017). Unlike 
Russia’s Eurasian integration program, which spatially is more like continuously fence-
building, Chinese economic statecraft follows the logic of a ‘diffused’ expansion. Beijing 
has not insisted on either binding state-to-state treaties or formal international institutions 
regarding the BRI, so as to maximize the flexibility and openness for both China and other 
countries involved in the BRI.8 
Inspired by Harvey’s theory of spatial fix and in the spirit of the Marxist idea of 
‘annihilation of space with time’ (Harvey, 2001a; Marx, 1973), Chinese scholars define 
BRI as a practice of space-time compression, in particular, to exchange ‘time’ with ‘space’ 
(Jiang, 2015). In A study of the Spatial Strategy of Belt and Road Initiative, an early report 
                                                        
8 Kaczmarski (2017) reaches a similar conclusion when comparing different regionalism embodied in the 
Eurasian Economic Union promoted by Russia and China’s BRI.    




commissioned by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development in 2015, 
Chinese researchers explicitly advocated that BRI should help China reconfigure the 
spatial features of its development model. The influential report emphasizes the BRI’s 
potential to reconfigure China’s own regional development strategy to make use of ‘full 
scale, all directional opening-up’ as a way to facilitate comprehensive development of all 
major regions within China (China Academy of Urban Planning and Design, 2015). 
Earlier, China’s regional development was characterized with significant regional 
unevenness and official policies emphasized the ‘ladder-up’ (tidu) nature of regional 
development, referring to the declining levels of factor endowments and economic 
development from the east and west of China. It was subsequently represented by the 
‘three economic belts’ policy (sanda jingji didai) formulated in the Seventh Five-year 
Plan (1986-1990). These three belts are the eastern (coastal), central and western regions, 
with assigned specific roles that purportedly witnessed a reasonable sequence of economic 
development (Fan, 1997, p. 622; p. 624). 
In response to such earlier regional development models, the BRI is expected to 
provide new opportunities to curb such a high degree of unevenness in development. The 
above-mentioned report reads: ‘The transformation of world economic and trade 
framework and the ebb and flow of big power without exception all takes reconfiguration 
of domestic structures to handle the changes in the external situations. We need to modify 
China’s internal spatial structures as to support the BRI in its smooth expansion’ (China 
Academy of Urban Planning and Design, 2015). The report further specifies the 
construction of multiple corridors so that ‘separation between the maritime and land 
routes, east-west division’ will be transformed to ‘comprehensive planning between the 




maritime and land Routes, balanced emphasis on East and West, thorough connection 
between the South and North’ (China Academy of Urban Planning and Design, 2015), 
essentially putting an end to the ‘three economic belts’ policy. Through such endeavors, 
the report envisions each major domestic region corresponding to a transnational 
development zone/corridor.  
 
Knowledge production for a global China  
The Chinese state mobilizes its resources to actively promote specific knowledge and 
expertise that shapes and spreads the increasingly expanding scale of Chinese activities 
around the world. One key effort in this regard is the national-level ‘MOE Project of Key 
Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences at Universities’ set up by the 
Ministry of Education of the Chinese government (MOE) since 1999. These centers are 
regarded within the Chinese university system and research communities as the most 
influential and prestigious research hubs in the humanities and social sciences. Among 
these centers, eight were specifically devoted to area and country studies or international 
affairs. The selection of country/areas to be covered by these Key Research Institutes 
reflects certain preference in the Ministry’s global geographic imaginary: three traditional 
major powers or regions (the United States, Europe, and Russia) along with four nearby 
regions or regional configurations (North-East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the 
Middle East). Such spatial and geographic vision resonates well with the general scalar 
orientation in China’s foreign policy stance during the late 1990s: emphasis on big power 
politics and the nearby regions, with very limited reach to regions that are traditionally 
distant from China’s home territory (Lanteigne, 2009, chapter 6). 




Since 2015, the Ministry of Education has started a new round of institutional 
building in university-based research centers, specifically to encourage and finance the 
establishment of ‘Area and country research incubation centers’. The new list of nationally 
recognized centers is much more extensive (numbers of centers in parentheses): Africa 
(3), Arabic world (3), ASEAN/Southeast Asia (3), Latin America (2), South Asia (2), 
Central Asia (2), the Oceania (1), Eastern and Central Europe (1); US (2), Germany (2), 
Japan (2), France (2), Russia (2), Canada (2), UK (2). Overall, these centers provide 
comprehensive coverage of countries and regions around the world, including regions not 
geographically contiguous with China, such as Canada, Oceania, South Africa, Latin 
America, and the Arabic World. The new list is more spatially sensitive as it covers 
countries within a specific geographic area, such as Germany and France in Europe, Japan 
in East Asia/Asia Pacific. In the document, the Depart of Social Sciences of the MOE 
specifically stipulates the main goal for this plan is to ‘provide intellectual support and 
talent guarantee for the reform projects of the state’ (Ministry of Education, 2015). 
In 2017, a different department (Depart of International Cooperation and Exchanges) 
of the MOE launched another round of institutional building specifically in the field of 
country and area studies, opening up registration of university-based centers for country 
and area studies. The goal of expanding the officially recognized university-based centers 
for country and area studies is to ‘serve the state strategy and overall situation in foreign 
policy, fully promote the Belt and Road … As the central leadership places high 
significance to this task, our department also enlists that as part of our key priorities for 
2017 to further promote the countries and area studies and set a comprehensive coverage 
of all countries and regions in the world’ (Ministry of Education, 2017). By the end of 




2018, the new series of university-based country and area studies centers registered with 
MOE included more than 400 centers based at more than 100 institutions of higher 
educations. These registered centers/institutes cover the ‘supermajority’ of countries and 
regions in the world (School for African Studies, 2018). 
Through collective remapping Eurasia and the state-led construction of a globally 
oriented knowledge base to support the spatial expansion of China’s foreign policy, China 
has presented a voice, for the first time in its modern history, to establish a global theme. 
Chinese elites now intentionally produce knowledge according to altered spatial 
parameters and imaginations. That is a sign that China is no longer trapped in ‘oriental 
sinology’ (Vukovich, 2012) and begins what Liang Qichao, the most prominent Chinese 
intellectual of the early 20th century, had envisioned as the last phase in China’s three 
phases of global integration: from an ancient ‘Unified China’ to a medieval ‘China of 
Asia’ to the modern ‘China of the World’ (see Karl, 1998, p.1097). The ever-expanding 
scale of China’s connectedness with the world should therefore be seen as the sociospatial 
reconfiguration of China’s global connectivity: from ‘China of Asia’ to ‘China of Euro-
Afro-Asia’ and on the road to ‘China of the World’. The question, then, is how such 
expanding scalar relations and related investments are productive of, and orchestrated 
through, an emerging network of infrastructural places in line with the contemporary 
territorial logic of global capitalism. 
 
Corridorization and the reconfiguration of state spatiality 




Corridors as a spatial formation 
Corridors have become the key spatial idea driving development policies and investments 
in infrastructure globally. Traditionally, corridors were thought to consist of physical 
infrastructure and logistic hubs to connect centers of political power or production. Today, 
the rise of corridors is at the heart of a process of spatial restructuring and geographical 
reimagining. The corridor as structuring principle 
 
‘privileges cross-border connections and integration with global value chains 
(GVCs). The imperative of this emergent regime, as demonstrated by policy 
discourse and investment priorities, is to ‘get the territory right’ in order to attract 
foreign investment, foster industrial upgrading and export-oriented growth’ 
(Schindler and Kanai, 2019, p. 2). 
 
Corridors are intimately connected to an ‘emergent regime of infrastructure-led 
development whose ultimate objective is to produce functional transnational territories 
that can be “plugged in”’ to global networks of production and trade. Large-scale 
infrastructure projects such as railways, highways, dams, ports and regional power grids 
underpin comprehensive territorial development plans geared toward extracting resources, 
producing commodities, and moving goods to manufacturing facilities and finally to 
market’ (Schindler and Kanai, 2019, p.1). In the context of the BRI, Chinese researchers 
define the corridor as ‘an economic cooperation mechanism among different regions, built 
on transportation infrastructure. Economic corridors consist of three dimensions: 
infrastructure, urbanization and economic development’ (Y. Wu, 2017, p. 68). 




The making of corridors should be defined as a sociospatial process—a ‘spatial 
economic build-up … defined as sub-regional economic cooperation mechanism that 
organically integrates production, investment, trade and infrastructural construction into 
one body within specific trans-national regional scale’ (Liu and Lu, 2017, p.1). These 
reconstructions often necessitate transnational infrastructures crossing the limits of 
national jurisdictions and thus involving politics of scale as state spatiality is altered. 
Corridorization practices are part and parcel of the reterritorializing effects of global 
capitalism directed at the reorganization of administrations into variegated zones, exclaves 
of special jurisdiction, and layered border regimes (Bachmann et al., 2018; Mezzadra and 
Neilson, 2013).  
China has adopted corridorization as a central spatial strategy to restructure its 
relations with nearby regions and across the Euro-Asian landmass. The official 2015 BRI 
document states the key goal of the BRI is to construct six major economic corridors along 
different directions, in a clearly all-inclusive, comprehensive manner. It reflects the above-
mentioned re-scaling practices of China’s evolving visions and spatial strategies. Chinese 
researchers generally assume that economic corridors develop through four stages. The 
first stage is primarily focused on constructing transportation infrastructure. The second 
stage moves to urbanization and  the revival of rural and urban infrastructure to facilitate 
industrialization and improve the investment environment for small-and-medium sized 
enterprises while enhancing investment in infrastructure for tourism and other sectors. 
Ultimately, the so-called regional development plan aims to expand the economic 
corridor. The third stage prioritizes facilitating the flow of goods, services, and personnel. 
The fourth stage focuses on coordinating various regional development plans and policies 




of different countries, to form the cross-border economic corridor in its real sense (Y. Wu, 
2017, pp. 28-29). During this corridorization process the three dimensions of 
infrastructure building, urbanization and economic development are expected to proceed 
in parallel and mutually influence each other. Currently, BRI economic corridors rely 
predominantly on infrastructural building, especially transportation (Y. Wu, 2017, p. 29).   
Spatial state reconfiguration via corridorization 
The idea of building corridors as a scalar fix shares affinity with other spatial strategies 
used in China. Current practices of corridorization build on the country’s 
development strategy pursued after 1978. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the 
party-state created special economic and administrative zones to link the isolated Chinese 
economy with the global trade system. Aiwa Ong’s work on variegated types of 
sovereignty in Asia emphasizes that zoning was central to China’s unique way of 
reterritorializing state space. According to Ong, the concept of ‘Greater China’, popular 
since the 1980s, consists of special economic and administrative zones that were aimed at 
integrating adjacent areas including Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao economically and 
politically (Ong, 2004, p.71). In the context of the emerging ‘Pacific rim’ economy, 
scholars have pointed out the importance of Chinese ‘bamboo networks’ for economic 
integration and investment activities in the Asia-Pacific region (Gao, 2003; Olds and 
Yeung, 1999). More recently, the Chinese state reformed the scalar institutional forms that 
govern city clusters and city regions within the Chinese administrative system in order to 
adapt to the changing logics of economic competition, production and labor markets (F. 
Wu, 2016).  




It becomes clear from this detour that the implementation of BRI projects follows a time-
tested range of state spatiality. Even though corridorization is at the core of the BRI, it 
corresponds and interlinks with other elements of a ‘multi-spatial metagovernance’ (see 
Jessup and Sum, 2017; Lee et al., 2017) that have territorial rescaling effects on 
administrative practices and the urbanization of regions outside China. The design of BRI 
exemplifies this logic: while its ‘interconnectivity’ policies do not challenge national 
sovereignty, they certainly promote transformations at the local or regional scale 
essentially following the logistics of international production networks, trade flows and 
energy supply (Lim, 2017; Summers, 2016). ‘Belt Road Initiative’, write Jessop and Sum 
(2017, p. 4), ‘aims to constitute and (meta)govern relations among territories, places, 
scales and networks and to build trans-regional infrastructure, trading and commercial 
networks that link Eurasia and Africa.’  
These corridors obviously are not imposed in an imperial style. Researchers who 
examine BRI- related processes of corridorization in different contexts—e.g. Murton and 
Lord (2019) on the Trans-Himalayan power corridors, Williams et al. (2019) with respect 
to global urbanization, and Akhter (2018) and Karrar (2019) on the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corrridor (CPEC) CPEC—conclude that the geographies of these corridors, 
their nodes, connections, intersections, and exclusions, are typically negotiated through 
preexisting political relations of various places and through complicated procedures and 
contestations. The infrastructural policies that link, for instance, Yunnan province in 
Southwest China with its neighboring countries illustrate the locally determined nature of 
promoting border-crossing links and reconfigurations of regional territoriality (Su, 2013).9 
                                                        
9 Similarly, Chinese researchers claim that ‘The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic 
corridor is buttressed by key transportation lines and combined transportation routes, take cities 




Meanwhile, broadly similar forms of corridorization are strongly pushed outside of the 
BRI too.10 The Asian Development Bank financed a series of studies to inquire the 
benefits of trans-border economic corridors in Southeast Asia, Central Asia and South 
Asia (De and Iyengar, 2014; Ministry of Finance, India, 2017). Partly set as projects 
competing with the BRI, Japan and India have envisioned similar corridors (e.g. the Asia 
Africa Growth Corridor) as joint international development projects across South Asia up 
to East Africa (The Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2017). 
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
During a state visit to Pakistan in April 2015, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang committed $46 
billion to fund energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan over a decade. This 
announcement scaled up the already extensive presence of Chinese capital and expertise in 
Pakistan in multiple sectors, in particular the nuclear sector, hydropower, and highways 
(esp. the Karakoram Highway), and aimed to integrate CPEC into the larger BRI 
narratives. CPEC now is supposed to be ‘closely related to the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), and therefore requires closer cooperation and greater progress’ (National 
Development and Reform Commission, 2015). Pakistani officials called the CPEC a ‘fate 
changer’ (The Nation, 2016). 
With the start of construction works for railways and road networks, large portions 
of Pakistan are to be reconstructed as energy and transport corridors that stretch up 
                                                                                                                                                                       
and ports (Kunming, Mandalay, Dhaka, Chittagong, Kolkata) as key knots/hubs, to facilitate 
connectivity and social economic development on sub-regional trans-national levels, which is 
meant to take energy transportation, trade, industrial cooperation and humanitarian communication 
as the key priorities. Its purpose is to align connections among economic and trade routes and 
development axis (“spindle”) which connect Southwest China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, West 
Bengal of India, the east and Northeast part of India’ (Liu and Lu, 2017, p. 1). 
10 For a discussion of on the notion of infrastructure corridors as spatial form of economic development see: 
Wilson and Bayón (2016);, Bouzarovski, et al. (2015), and Hildyard and Sol (2017).  




through northern Pakistan and into China’s western provinces, thereby connecting China’s 
landlocked Xinjiang with the port of Gwardar in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. At the 
Indian Ocean near Pakistan’s shared coastline with Iran, Gwadar is envisioned as a large 
port and Chinese window to the Arabian Sea. The CEPC also aims at rapidly globalizing 
Pakistan’s sluggish economy and involves manufacturing zones, investments in 
agriculture, solar and coal power plants as well as large hydropower dams. It is expected 
to put an end to electricity shortages and boost Pakistan’s development (CPEC Secretariat, 
2017; Lieven, 2015). These flows of capital and expertise from China, first of all, 
constitute a networked production of space between China and Pakistan, intended to 
provide the conditions of capitalist accumulation within Pakistan and to integrate Pakistan 
into a larger Asian infrastructural space. As of late 2019, Pakistan’s leaders claim that the 
CPEC is a model project for high quality collaboration for the construction of BRI 
(Xinhua, 2019).  
Yet, while it was Islamabad that initially proposed to China to create an economic 
corridor (AFP, 2016), the undertaking causes concern among Pakistanis, ranging from 
debates about contested territorial claims, the uneven distribution of infrastructure, local 
terror attacks as well as a possible administrative and financial impasse (Ahmed, 2017). 
These concerns become intelligible through the lens of spatial reconfiguration, because 
‘one source of suspicion about CPEC stems from fears of constituencies within Pakistan 
of its deterritorializing potential’ (Lim, 2017, p. 2). For one, Pakistan’s national autonomy 
could be challenged by a growing Chinese presence and because of the legal and financial 
conditions of ownership and control over infrastructure. The size of investment alone 
makes it critical for Pakistan’s financial sustainability. In addition to the initially proposed 




$46 billion suite of investments in order to build the CPEC, Beijing pledged an additional 
$50 billion to build several dams along the Indus River (Lieven, 2015; The New Indian 
Express, 2017). In short, the amount of CPEC-related infrastructure investments equal 
more than a third of Pakistan’s annual GDP in 2016 (World Bank, 2017). This comes on 
top of the $24.3 billion in official development aid and other official flows from China 
between 2000 and 2014.  
Chinese investments mostly come in the form of loans backed by sovereign 
guarantees that place the eventual responsibility of covering all debts related to CPEC 
projects on Pakistani taxpayers (Aiddata, 2017). Although CPEC investments will be 
undertaken in tranches stretching over 20 years, China’s domestic experience shows that 
the risk of defaults and underperforming infrastructure usage are huge (Ansar et al., 2016). 
While Pakistan needs significant economic progress in order to generate the revenues 
necessary to pay back interest and loans, Chinese companies involved in CPEC appear to 
be excluded from taxation and thus do not contribute to the fiscal base of the state. 
‘Pakistan,’ notes a critical observer, ‘risks losing its sovereignty and being beholden and 
exploited by China for its natural resources and geostrategic location’ (Malik, 2017). 
As far as security is concerned, CPEC-style corridorization involves an exclusive 
rescaling of security provisions that is contentious for its spatial effects and lack of fiscal 
transparency. The central government of Pakistan implemented a distinct governing 
structure to secure the construction of CPEC. For instance, given the insecure situation in 
tribal areas in Balochistan and the country’s northwest region where local opposition 
against the CPEC is outspoken and at times violent, Pakistan’s government deploys a 
15,000-strong ‘CPEC security force’ in addition to a ‘Gwadar Security Task Force’ with 




the sole purpose of protecting infrastructure, Chinese workers and technicians (The 
Express Tribute, 2016; Zimmerman, 2016,). Pakistani media reported that the civilian 
government could not agree with the military about the range of authority the CPEP 
security force should command, as the former was concerned that it might ‘expand 
military’s influence on law enforcement agencies at the cost of civilian administration’s 
authority’ (Syed 2016). The employment of special forces also reinforces a segregated 
regime for the movement of persons. Although Chinese labor came into Pakistan 
(especially the northern regions) for building roads and dams, foreign experts and eco-
tourists who were moving freely in the Gilgit region lost access almost completely. In 
addition, many key sites of CPEC infrastructure are closed to Pakistani citizens for 
security reasons. 
The military, which traditionally occupies a independent role in Pakistan, has 
become increasingly active throughout the CPEC spaces, adding to the economic burden 
and institutional messiness on the ground (Hussain, 2017). Beijing’s increasing security 
and military cooperation with Pakistan’s navy is first and foremost linked to CPEC 
(Baloch, 2017). The  progressive securitization of critical infrastructure including ports, 
pipelines and roads tends to increase the instances of domestic borders and exclusion 
practices in Pakistan (Lim, 2017). The key actors for road, pipeline and dam construction 
are on both sides state-owned enterprises with close connections to the military or are run 
by military personnel. While this ensures ownership on both sides, Pakistani experts have 
questioned whether the CPEC deal has ‘the necessary safeguards that will allow us to 
retain control of our territory if circumstances change’ (Qureshi, 2015). 




India’s government opposes Pakistan’s territorial reconfigurations as it views its own 
territorial concerns directly affected by CPEC. In January 2017, Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi – without mentioning the BRI by name – stated that ‘connectivity in itself 
cannot override or undermine the sovereignty of other nations’. In a critical remark about 
corridors, Modi said that ‘only by respecting the sovereignty of countries involved, can 
regional connectivity corridors fulfill their promise and avoid differences and discord’ 
(The News, 2017). India’s government primarily rejects CPEC because it runs through 
parts of Pakistani occupied Kashmir, which India claims to be part of its territory. The 
CPEC’s rescaling of Pakistan northern territory via infrastructure construction is therefore 
not only perceived as generally increasing China’s presence in the bilateral territorial 
conflict but also rendering these mountainous spaces official Pakistani territory 
(Kondapalli, 2017; Singh, 2015). 
The grandiose idea to reconstruct large parts of Pakistan as a giant ‘corridor’ to link 
China’s northwest region to the Indian Ocean is meant to create smooth logistical spaces 
through advanced transport and communication infrastructure. However, CPEC’s space-
smoothing intentions have to confront the ‘heterogeneous, fractured, and contradictory’ 
social space in relation to the uneven regional distribution of political power over space, 
which generates tendencies towards the militarization of corridors and enclaves of 
logistical and infrastructural space (Akhter, 2017, pp. 235-236). Although the 
deemphasizing of national borders characteristic for BRI maps corresponds with the 
spatial practices and concerns of building the CPEC (Lim, 2017), the latter is not about 
‘expropriation’ or ‘expansion’ of a Westphalian type territory. The ultimate consequences 
of an uneven modernization strategy that restructures scales and differentiations of state 




space in Pakistan remain unclear. As a key example of corridorization, the CPEC involves 
transnational bordering and parcelization or enclosure, somewhat similar to the earlier 
Chinese special economic zones. Meanwhile, it also heavily relies on place specific nodes 
and hubs (most notably the port of Gwardar) to create or reshape patterns of center and 
peripheral relations. For corridorization, the scale of sociospatial relations is usually 
zoomed in to a subnational-transnational level, creating a set of hierarchizations and 
vertical scalar divisions of labor that are different from a more horizontal spatial division 
of labor between traditional states.  
Similar practices of transnational corridorization are taking place along the other five 
officially-designated economic corridors as part of the BRI. In addition, sociospatial 
reconfiguration via BRI corridors now includes attempts to connect non-adjacent regions. 
For example, the traditional subnational region-to-region collaboration between China and 
Russia has been heavily concentrated in the collaboration between Northeast China and 
the Russian Far East, two regions across the Sino-Russian borders. As such practices did 
not produce the expected results of promoting regional economic and social development, 
the Russian and Chinese states have started to push for novel sub-national regional 
cooperation. The primary example is the collaboration between the Middle and Upper 
Yangtze Region of China and Russia’s Volga Federal District, which started in May 2013. 
Even though the two regions are geographically distant and have little prior contact, as of 
late 2019, this non-adjacent sub-national ‘corrdorization’ such as the Volga-Yangtze 
format is regarded as successful policy innovation under the BRI’s newly injected 
geographic visions (Liu, 2019, p.11).   





This article analyzes China’s recent economic statecraft through the lens of sociospatial 
reconfigurations. We build on the “TPSN” framework in order to theorize how China’s 
integration with the world reshapes the spatiality of global and regional connectivity and 
how the dominant physical and ideational spatial form of BRI investments – the corridor – 
reconfigures state spatiality.  
The BRI emerges through the interaction of state and capital in their convoluted 
relations of exerting and extending power, mastering and reconfiguring state space, 
through the practice of ‘spatial fix’ along multiple dimensions. The results constitute a 
new spatial vision, differing from both China’s imperial model of ‘concentric circles of 
civilization’ and the ‘greater China’ model of the reform period. The BRI instead reflects a 
post-modern geopolitical condition of ‘boundary-transgressing processes and tendencies 
that are undermining the state-centric assumptions of conventional geopolitics’ (Tuathail, 
2000: 166, see Agnew, 2003). These insights, while contributing to the new wave of 
infrastructure-centered research on the transformation of political order and territorial 
arrangements (Glass et al. 2019; Mayer and Acuto 2015; Neilson et al. 2018; Sassen 2019; 
Schouten et al. 2019), make one also cautious against overly simplifying interpretations 
that portray the BRI as an endeavor to realize Chinese regional or even global hegemony. 
Employing the concept of ‘sociospatial reconfiguration’ highlights that China’s spatial 
practices such as the BRI are different from territorial expropriation or territorial 
expansion and conquest. Yet, the concept of sociospatial reconfiguration uncovers 
powerful and far-reaching effects of the BRI. The fresh geo-visions of most BRI maps 
contain a post-Westphalian, Euro-Asian landmass and replace the cartographic, and by 
extension political, centrality of the ‘Atlantic world’. Though the implementation of the 




BRI is still in an early stage and might be slowed down due to China’s sluggish economic 
growth and other problems, it ties into dynamics that could lead to a deeper integration of 
regions and countries across the Euro-Asian continent via markets and security 
institutions, further solidifying the Afro-Euro-Asian complex. As such, the geography of 
continents and connectivity imagined through the BRI differs from the earlier 
‘metageography’ that arose during the Cold War (see Lewis and Wigen, 1997). 
Our research shows that the BRI has strikingly neoliberal characteristics. The 
collection of maps demonstrates a near exclusion of bounded territory. Its spatial 
parameters seem to be reinforcing, in obvious contrast to the rise of populist protectionist 
ideologies in the West, preexisting tendencies of globalization. For instance, national 
borders remain underdetermined reflecting a constantly expanding scale of the new Euro-
Asian entity. The main territorial pattern is not the nation or the region but the corridor. 
BRI corridors have a regional/transnational scale and require concrete measures of 
administrative territorial rescaling such as illustrated in the case of the CPEC. The 
construction of subnational and transnational corridors creates new frontiers, boundaries 
and enclosures (social, economic, jurisdictional). New infrastructural linkages and nodal 
connectivity among concrete urban hubs across production chains also results in places 
and special economic zones repositioned in newly emerging core-periphery relationships. 
The related logistics of supply chain capitalism often connect, as Schouten et al. (2019, p. 
289) emphasize, erstwhile marginal locations across ‘fractured socio-political landscapes’. 
The political rhetoric of the BRI therefore helps to foster narratives promoting these de-
pheripherizing moves. The resulting reconfiguration of state spatiality through multi-
layered, multi-scalar arrangements belies the easy division of ‘domestic’ and 




‘international’ along traditional national boundaries (Easterling, 2014; Neilson, 2014). To 
encourage further comparative and historical work we draw on Philip Steinberg’s work on 
maritime space to suggest that corridors belong to a new archetype instrumental to the 
sociospatial restructuring dynamics that underpin the BRI and beyond (Steinberg, 2001, 
pp. 41-67). 
The BRI’s heterogeneity and manifold local agency contradicts assumptions that 
foreground the grand schemes of geopolitics. As many countries, such as Myanmar, Sri 
Lanka, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Kenya, and Kazakhstan, experience similarly complex 
reconfigurations, corridorization in China’s New Silk Road initiative has major 
implications for the re-imagining and re-making of both local and global space. But as 
China further integrates with the world, this study does not offer a comprehensive 
assessment of the multifaceted rescaling of state space. For instance, the differences 
between corridors are not conceptualized. Likewise, we have only gestured to the 
observation that although China is the most powerful player in the reconstruction of Euro-
Asian space, it is unable to simply craft a regional order through ‘connectivity 
partnerships’ or physical infrastructure. Future studies on spatial reconfiguration also need 
to pay attention to military activities as well as digital infrastructures that increasingly 
undergird the geopolitical competition between, among others, the US, India, Russia and 
China.  
Studying the spatial aspects of the BRI is suggestive that merging IR and IPE 
frameworks is productive to exploring the dynamics of China’s rise in general. Future 
research should focus on local responses to BRI projects and examine how negotiation 
processes generate enduring outcomes in the form of changing sociospatial structuration 




of states and economies. Methodologically, this requires a focus on territorial state 
transformation and a granular and empirically thick understanding of China’s impact on 
dimensions of sociospatial restructuring (Hameiri, 2019; Klinger and Muldavin, 2019). 
Crucially, a spatial perspective reveals that China cannot easily translate its growing 
material power into transnational influence (over outcomes) and thus points to a classical 
IR puzzle. Despite billions spent on infrastructure projects, China cannot unilaterally 
impose new territorial forms along the Silk Road. Instead, Chinese actors find themselves 
in a sandwich position: on the one hand, negotiating with local interest constellations and, 
on the other hand, implementing capitalist sociospatial principles as part of a global 
coalition of investors and infrastructure developers. As a result, BRI projects ultimately 
remain embedded in processes that are only partially of China’s own making. 
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